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Unemployment Insurance and the Role of Retained Earnings from Part-Time Work
Chris Hocker
In this paper, I adapt the game-theoretical model of Zuckerman (1985) to include the 
decision to take on a part-time job while receiving unemployment benefits. The optimal 
stopping rule is defined, as is the rule for accepting part-time work while receiving 
unemployment compensation. It is shown that an increase in the value of part-time work 
actually decreases its appeal, due to the effects on reservation wages.
I. Introduction
! The rationale for unemployment insurance is rather straightforward. One, it seeks 
to smooth consumption for workers during times of economic stress. This, in turn, 
encourages the worker to make a good job choice. Since its inception in 1935, 
unemployment insurance has been the focus of scrutiny, with special interest in the 
effects on social welfare and employment. Yoder (1931) preempted the implementation 
of UI law with a discussion of the increased unemployment and reduced wages that 
would accompany compulsory insurance. Rorty (1936) put it even more bluntly: “The 
unfortunate situation, today, is that the average worker has been promised the rainbow 
with a pot of gold at the end.” More recently, authors have sought to measure the 
incentive effects of unemployment insurance and the return to full-time work. 
! One aspect of the unemployment insurance system that has not been analyzed 
in detail has been the issue of part-time work. When an unemployed worker is receiving 
unemployment benefits and searching for a job, he is allowed to take on a part-time job 
in the meantime and still receive unemployment benefits. The idea of this wage 
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disregard is to encourage work. In the body of unemployment literature, there are only a 
handful of notable examples of research on part-time work. Munts (1970) measured the 
disincentive effects of a certain kind of disregard in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Nebraska 
and suggested that in the face of extreme disincentives, workers will choose to cut back 
on working part-time. McCall (1996) studied the effects of varying the size of the 
disregard and Kyyra (2008) used Finnish data to estimate the likelihood of returning to a 
full-time job given that the worker took on a part-time job during his search, and found 
that partial unemployment associated with short-term jobs taken on during an 
unemployment spell facilitate the transition back to full-time work. Gerfin and Lechner 
(2002) find results similar to those of Kyyraʼs in a Swtizerland study.
! One curious aspect of the American unemployment insurance system that is 
addressed briefly in Munts but not McCall is the type of part-time wage disregard that 
the government employs. Currently, in 39 states, this disregard is some fixed dollar 
amount, and above that, additional hours worked at the part-time job will lead to a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction in benefits. The remaining states and Washington, DC employ  
a partial earnings disregard. In a partial retained earnings system, the unemployed 
workerʼs unemployment compensation is reduced by a fraction of a dollar for every 
dollar he earns at a part-time job. These two schemes are illustrated in Figure 1 . The 
fact that states have been slowly adopting this partial disregard over time leads to the 
obvious question of whether or not this system is any better at either encouraging return 
to work or decreasing the costs of the system. This paper seeks to close that gap, 
borrowing from the reservation wage model developed by Zuckerman (1985).
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! The main issue comparing the effects of either system is that part-time work 
detracts from searching for a full-time job and extends the benefit period. So 
encouraging working part-time has the possible effect of delaying return to full-time 
work. On the other hand, it is possible that increased part-time work has positive 
benefits, such as a stronger commitment to the workforce and increased income. The 
effect of allowing more job offers. Since the full retained earnings benefit scheme is flat 
beyond the disregard,  which represents no additional income for an additional hour of 
work, there is the possibility that a worker chooses a sub-optimal part-time work 
schedule, which may then increase the cost of the program, as suggested by Munts 
(1970). 
! In this paper, we will compare changes in the unemployment benefit through 
direct changes in the benefit, and through changes in the replacement rate r . It is found 
that an increase in the unemployment benefit, either through the increase in the initial 
payment or the part-time wage replacement rate, decreases the appeal of part-time 
work, most likely because of the effects on reservation wages.
! The paper is organized as follows. Part II introduces the model, most of which is 
adapted from Zuckerman. Part III presents a general solution. Part IV presents a 
numerical example. Part V presents some concluding comments.
II. The Model
! In a given period, an individual is endowed with 1  unit of time that is inelastically 
devoted to employment activities. When he is full-time employed, he works the entire 
time in that period, the period denoted by n , and when he is unemployed, he expends 1  
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searching for a job. Searching in period n  incurs a time cost sn . Job offers arrive 
randomly in a given period.  Fsn (i)  denotes the distribution function of the present value 
of the lifetime earnings associated with the highest job offer received over the period. 
 Fsn (i)  is stochastically increasing in sn , and for any given sn , the searcher knows the 
distribution of Fsn . Additionally, the individual is free to accept a part-time job from a pool 
of part-time jobs at any time. These jobs are readily available and all pay a wage of wP  
and require a commitment of hP  hours per week, both of which are fixed and given 
exogenously. This analysis considers all payments net of search costs, which are not 
specifically analyzed here. When he is part-time employed, his search time is 1! sn
! The government sets two vectors: U = (u j ,N )  and UP = (u jp , !N ,r,d) , which are 
unemployment compensation for an unemployed individual and unemployment 
compensation for an unemployed individual who has taken on a part-time job. UP  is 
determined as a function of the workerʼs income from part-time work. When the 
individual is working part-time, his benefit is u j ! wPhP (1! r) , where j = 1,2 , 
differentiating between the full retained earnings schedule and the partial retained 
earnings schedule, respectively. The individual chooses sn , the amount of search he 
commits to in period n , T , the point at which he accepts the best current full-time job 
offer, when to take on a part-time job, and T P . If he takes on a part-time job, his 
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maximum benefit period increases from N  to !N  because the worker has a fixed pool 
of benefits from which to draw, u jN , with 
 !N =
T P + u j (N " T P ) / (u j " wPhn
Pr + d),!if !d < wPhn
Pr < u + d
T P + u j (N " T P ) / (u j " wPhn
Pr),!if !wPhn
Pr # d
$
%
&
'&
! Where d  is the level of the disregard in the full retained earnings payment 
schedule. If, at the end of !N  periods the worker has not accepted a job, he takes on a 
default job, with earnings I . Since part-time work is always available, the lower bound 
on I  is wPhP .
! This paper seeks to compare the two schemes of unemployment compensation 
described in the Introduction. The first is one in which earnings from a part-time job are 
disregarded until his income equals d , at which point benefits decrease one-for-one 
with earnings. The second scheme is one in which an additional dollar of earnings 
decreases benefits by 1! r , 0 ! r ! 1 , . Because the total payments over the course of 
the spell must be equivalent between the full and partial payment schemes, the 
following relation holds between the initial unemployment benefit levels: 
u2 = u1(u1 + 2d)(1! r)
The individualʼs objective function, as suggested by Zuckerman, is given by 
f (T ,T P , s,! |U,UP ) = E[Xsn (T ) + Tu
j + wPhn
Pr(T " T P )]P(T # $N ) + E[I + $N u j + wPhn
Pr( $N " T P )]P(T > $N )!!!(1)
where Xsn (T )  is the value of the highest offer received in period n , given search level 
sn . This equation represents the expected lifetime earnings of the individual as a 
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function of the unemployment benefit and earnings from part-time and full-time 
employment. 
! Given that the individual follows the behavior (T ,T P , sn ) 1, the (benevolent) 
governmentʼs objective is to select (U = (u,N ),UP = (uP , !N ,r,d)) , which maximizes the 
individualʼs expected lifetime income (productivity) net of transfers,
g(U,UP |T ,T P ,! , sn ) = E[Xsn (T ) + w
Phn
Pr(T " T P )]P(T # $N ) + E[I + wPhn
Pr( $N " T P )]P(T > $N )!!!!(2)
Where the payments u j do not appear in g  because they represent zero sum transfer 
payments from the point of view of society2.
! As in Zuckerman, the solution of the model involves a Stackelberg (1952) 
solution concept, with the government serving as the leader and the worker as the 
follower. The government anticipates the workerʼs reaction (T !,T P*, s*n )  and therefore 
determines an optimal policy maximizing g(U,UP |T !,T P*, s*n )  with respect to U and UP .
! As is common in the literature (Devine 1991), the worker employs a reservation 
wage strategy, which is to accept the highest full-time wage in a given period, given that 
it is at least as big as his reservation wage. In this model, Zuckerman defines the 
reservation wage as the recursive equation 
!n"1 = u
j + wPhPnr+ !n +Gsn (!n )!!!!(3)
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1 As will be shown below, there is only a single spell of part-time work within the unemployment spell.
2 These payments come from taxpayers and are transferred to the unemployed. So from the point of view 
of society, any good given to an unemployed worker is taken from an employed worker, and g  seeks to 
capture the added effect of this transfer. Presumably, these unemployed workers have paid into the 
system and are therefore receiving their own money, but this model does not take budget balancing into 
account.
with ! "N = I  and Gsn (!n ) = (y " !n )dFsn (y)
!n
#
$ , where Gsn  is the expected return from sn  
time units devoted to search in a period, given reservation wage !n .  It is clear that Gsn  
is convex, nonnegative, monotonically increasing in !n  for any given search effort, and 
Gsn (!) = 0 . 
Proposition 1 . The reservation wages !n  are decreasing over time.
! Proof. The relation in (3) , combined with the fact that Gsn (!n ) " 0 , establishes the 
! proof of Proposition 1 .
III. General Solution
! The worker chooses whether or not to work part-time in any given period 
according to the following rule illustrated in Figure 2  in the Appendix. The worker 
chooses to search full-time until T P , where his Gsn  curve, which represents the value of 
accepting a full-time job at his reservation wage in period n , falls to the point where it 
equals the value of accepting a part-time job, at which point he chooses to work part-
time. When he takes on a part-time job, his Gsn  curve will then flatten because the 
reservation wages increase and the unemployment benefit decreases, leading to an 
increase in the number of periods available to receive benefits. This is summarized in 
Proposition 2 .
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Proposition 2 . A worker takes on a part-time job at G1 = wPhPr + u j  and quits the job at 
G
1!hP
= wPhP .
! Proof. For wPhP ! G1,G1"hP ! w
PhPr + u , G1(!n ) " G1#hP (!n ) , since Gsn is 
! monotonically decreasing.
! In order to determine what happens when the government changes its policy 
from full to partial retained earnings, define D = u2 + wPhPr ! (u1 + wPhP )  as the additional 
income that the worker receives from a partial retained earnings policy.  In order to 
determine the effect of changing r , take u1  and d  as fixed, and recalling that 
u2 = u1(u1 + 2d)(1! r) , we obtain 
dD / dr = wPhP ! (u1(u1 + 2d) / (1! r) !!!!!!!(4)
d 2D / dr2 = !(1 / 2) u1(u1 + 2d) / (1! r)3 !!!!!(5)
Note that dD / dr > 0  when wPhP > u1(u1 + 2d) / (1! r)  and d 2D / dr2 < 0 , implying that 
D  is concave in r . So moving from full to partial retained earnings only increases the 
value of part-time work when wPhP < u1(u1 + 2d) / (1! r)  . Because of the income cutoff 
in the full retained earnings schedule, d + u1 > wPhP > u1(u1 + 2d) / (1! r) .
! Now consider an increase in the value of part-time work, demonstrated in Figure 
3 of the Appendix, either from an increase in u  or a decrease in r  that increases the 
total value, as illustrated above. An increase in wPhPr + u  will also increase G , since an 
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increase in the benefit increases the reservation wage, shifting both the part-time 
income curve and the G  curve up, and also because an increase in u  necessarily 
decreases the number of periods available.
Proposition 3 .  An increase in the unemployment benefit u j  will increase T P .
! Proof. It is clear that since d !Gsn ("n ) / d"n # dGsn ("n ) / d"n , !G  intersects w
PhPr + u !j
! at a larger value of !n  than G  intersects wPhPr + u j .
! Now, knowing the individualʼs reaction curve, the government employs an optimal 
policy . In optimizing the governmentʼs objective function, note that while u j  does not 
directly appear in the function, N  is determined by u j , so an optimal u j*  and an optimal 
N *  are complementary. Since sn  and !  are determined by T P , the independent 
decisions that the individual makes are T (U,UP ),T P (U,UP ) . We then plug these optimal 
values back into the governmentʼs objective function.
IV. Numerical Example
! Suppose u = 20 , d = 10 , wPhP = 20 , r = 1 , and F  is uniformly distributed over the 
interval (20,20 + 20s) , so we have 
F = 1 / (20s),!!20 ! y ! 20 + 20s
!!!!!!0,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!otherwise
And this gives us 
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G1(x) = (1 / 40)(x
2 ! 80x +1600)
G1/2 (x) = (1 / 20)(x
2 ! 60x + 900)
We set N = 5  and calculate the reservation wages and values of G1  in each period.
Period
Res Wage
G1
1 2 3 4 5
294 118 72.5 50 20
152 26 2.5 10 --
So we see that in Period 2 , G1  falls below the value of the part-time job, giving us T P . 
From here we can calculate !N = 8 , which allows us to calculate the G1/2  curve from 
here, giving us
Period
Res 
Wage
G1/2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.7E+28 1.8E+14 1.93E+08 62165 1134 166 65 20
1.40E+57 1.6E+29 1.93E+08 61051 924 61 5 --
Note here that !N = 7 , making total time working part-time ! = 5 .
! Now increase the benefit to 30 .
Period
Res Wage
G1
1 2 3 4 5
1060 220 100 60 20
810 90 10 10 --
Here, T P = 3 , !N = 6 . Now compute the part-time reservation wages from !N .
Period
Res Wage
G1/2
1 2 3 4 5 6
2834603718 238120 2201 226 75 20
2.80E+09 235662 1920 101 5 --
This gives us !N = 5 , ! = 2 .
! There are a couple things this example highlights. Note that the values of G  are 
increased when the individual is working part-time. So we can see that increasing the 
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benefit level actually makes part-time work less appealing, which is a surprising result 
but makes sense in the context of the effects of the unemployment benefit on the 
reservation wages.
V. Conclusions
! A simple model that adapts Zuckermanʼs search model has been presented with 
the introduction of subsidized part-time work. Conditions for the workerʼs optimal full-
time/part-time/unemployment decision have been presented. There are, however, a 
number of issues that need mention.
! This model does not assign a value to leisure. A more complex model could take 
into account the tradeoff between consumption and leisure. This would require relaxing 
the assumption that the workerʼs time is inelastically set to be for either search or work, 
which is not too philosophically difficult to allow. Another area it would be illuminating to 
explore is in other shapes of G . This analysis took it to be uniform for mathematical 
simplicity, but experimenting with normal distributions or otherwise may introduce other 
complexities to the analysis.
! This analysis takes all unemployment benefits to be transfer payments with a 
zero-sum effect on society. An extension of this analysis would view this in a different 
light, by either taking past employment into consideration when determining benefit 
levels or taking into consideration total social welfare. In either case, considering a 
balanced budget would be beneficial for further analysis.
! More importantly, the result that an increase in the value of part-time work leads 
to a reduction in part-time work needs further exploration for being counterintuitive and 
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contrary to the literature. McCallʼs (1997) results demonstrated that an increase in the 
disregard leads to an initial increase in working part-time, but a decrease over time in 
the value of part-time work because of the decreasing reservation wages.  Also, while 
this paper does explore what happens when the part-time work replacement rate 
changes, and suggests that states with partial retained earnings will dissuade 
unemployed workers from finding part-time jobs, more work needs to be done in the 
future to determine whether or not these systems are any better than full retained 
earnings.
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Figure 1. Full retained earnings schedule versus partial retained earnings 
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Figure 2.  When the part-time income curve is greater than the G curve, the worker takes on a part-time job, 
resulting in a flatter G curve, where he continues to work until his part-time G curve is equal to I
I
wh+u
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Figure 3. An increase in u leads to a delay in the acceptance of a part-time job and decreases the maximum length of the eligibility period.
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